Saturn and State Economic Development by Bartik, Timothy J. et al.
Upjohn Research 
Journal Articles Externally Published Works 
4-1-1987 
Saturn and State Economic Development 
Timothy J. Bartik 
Vanderbilt University, bartik@upjohn.org 
Charles Becker 
University of Colorado 
Steve Lake 
Vanderbilt University 
John Bush 
Harvard University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/jrnlarticles 
 Part of the Regional Economics Commons 
Citation 
Bartik, Timothy J., Charles Becker, Steve Lake, and John Bush. 1987. "Saturn and State Economic 
Development." Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy 2(1)(Spring): 29-40. 
This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
SPRING 1987 VOL. 2, NO. 1 
6 ECONOMIC ISSUES 
7 SATURN: THE TENNESSEE LESSONS 
William F. Fox and C. Warren Neel 
An explanation of how Tennessee successfully landed General 
Motor's huge Saturn project. 
17 SATURN: UNION AND COMMUNITY ISSUES 
Anthony Borden 
A Tennessee journalist says the Saturn project is a high risk 
gamble-for both the state and UA W workers. 
25 THE SATURN LABOR AGREEMENT / James K. McCollum 
and M. Carl Ziemke 
An outline of the unique terms of the Saturn labor/management 
agreement. 
29 SATURN AND STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
T. J. Bartik, C. Becker, S. Lake, and 1. Bush 
Low wages brought Saturn to Tennessee. That is the conclusion 
of these economists, who urge states to invest in comprehensive 
economic development. 
41 ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
42 NATIONAL FORESTS: MULTIPLE USE POLICIES 
John V. Krutilla 
The value of the national forests lies in their multiple resources 
and not just in their timber. 
51 NATIONAL FORESTS: FEDERAL ASSET OR 
LIABILITY? / John B. Crowell, Jr. 
Should we cut more timber from the national forests? Yes, says a 
former Department of Agriculture official. We should double the 
cut. 
56 NATIONAL FORESTS: A CONSERVATIONIST 
PERSPECTIVE / Peter C. Kirby 
DQubling the national forest timber cut would be an 
environmental disaster, argues a senior counsel from The 
Wilderness Society. 
FORUM FOR APPLIED RESEARCH AND PUBLIC POLICY/SPRING 1987 
SATURN AND 
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General Motors' (GM) decision to locate its Saturn plant in Tennessee gives an aura of success to Tennessee's economic development policies. The question this poses is whether the Saturn success is 
generally a good model for state economic development policies. 
To analyze this issue, the following article examines three .questions. 'The 
fIrst is whether the key factors that attracted Saturn to Tennessee can and should 
be adopted or modilled by state governments. Our conclusion is that state 
policies can influence the location of plants like Saturn, ·although some policies 
might prove extremely costly. 
The second question is whether the benefits of a project such as Saturn 
are worth the costs. We will argue that Saturn's location in Tennessee has net 
benefits for the state and nation. These benefits would have been reduced 
if Tennessee had provided more costly subsidies. Further, state and national 
benefits derived from Saturn might be considerably less in a different state. 
Finally, a key issue is whether Tennessee and other states should focus 
their economic development policies on projects such as Saturn. We will argue 
that while projects like Saturn have net benefIts, the main tasks of state economic 
development policy today should be to improve basic public services and in-
frastructure and to deal with gaps in capital and labor markets. 
WHAT ATTRACTED SATURN TO TENNESSEE 
GM stressed Tennessee's location near the center of Saturn's markets as 
the key to the location decision: "Low freight costs (were) cited by (former 
Saturn President) William Hoglund as the most important economic factor in 
h d .. ,,1 t e eClSlOn. 
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Another key factor, and perhaps the most important, was Tennessee's lower 
wage rates-a factor that neither GM nor the state of Tennessee emphasized 
for obvious political reasons. Even though Saturn's unionized workers would 
be paid the same regardless of the plant's location, Tennessee's low wage rates 
will lower the prices that Saturn will pay to suppliers near the plant. 
To measure the importance of wage rates, we constructed a computer model 
of the Saturn location decision.2 This model begins by examining the. Saturn 
location decision as if only access to markets mattered. The United States was 
divided into 32- by 32-mile squares that represented possible Saturn loca-
tions in the model. We calculated transportation costs from each location to 
the 42 domestic railheads that GM uses to serve the 48 continental states. 
Market demand at each railhead was assumed to be proportional to the number 
of Chevrolet registrations in nearby states. One version of the model used ac-
tual 1984 registrations, while another version used predicted registrations for 
the year 2000.3 
With 1984 market demand distribution, the optimal "market access" loca-
tion for Saturn would be near Indianapolis, Indiana. With the year 2000 
demand weights, the optimal location shifts toward the southwest-to a loca-
tion near Terre Haute, Indiana. 
We then added labor costs and taxes to the model and simplified the model 
by only considering sites in Indiana and six surrounding states that had access 
to rail lines and two highways (i.e., sites that offered some minimal level of 
market access). 
With the addition of labor costs and taxes, the model indicates that Nashville 
is the lowest cost site of the 130 locations considered.4 Table 1 presents 
results for a city in each of the seven states considered, along with results from 
Minneapolis and New York City. Minneapolis and New York are included 
because both offered large subsid.ies to Saturn. Lexington, Kentucky, and 
Kalamazoo, Michigan, were finalists in the competition for Saturn. The data 
only reflects normal tax rates and does not include any special tax subsidies. 
Table 1 indicates that lower supplier labor costs were the key to Tennessee's 
ability to capture Saturn.5 Tennessee offered the lowest labor costs of the states 
TABLE 1 
Estimated Saturn Costs Per Car 
Average cost Local State Total 
of Transport Supplier and Measured 
Location to Market Labor Cost Local Taxes Costs 
Nashville TN $426 $159 $118 $703 
Lexington, KY 423 186 106 715 
St. Louis, M 0 419 172 134 725 
Bloomington, IL 417 202 162 781 
Kalamazoo, MI 430 244 116 790 
Terre Haute, IN 413 209 168 790 
Marysville, OH 427 219 169 815 
Minneapolis, MN 494 195 ($689)* 
New York, NY 535 184 ($719)* 
*Labor and transport costs only. Tax costs were not available for these states. 
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with good market access, but other locations were superior on other cost fac-
tors. (Labor costs would be even more important in location decisions for fIrms 
that do not pay uniform national wages to their own workers). 
Despite the low impact of taxes on total costs, tax incentives are a more 
attractive economic development policy to many states than lowering wages 
and transport costs. States obviously cannot change their location, so transport 
costs can only be marginally affected by transportation improvements: State 
and local labor laws and business recruitment practices can help keep wages 
low, and in the past many Southern governments have followed a low-wage 
policy.6 But using low wages for economic development is contradictory if one 
believes the purpose of economic development policy is to increase family 
income. 
Tax incentives can affect location decisions when other costs are close be-
tween two states. For example, our findings imply that Kentucky could have 
captured Saturn by lowering taxes by $12 per car, or $5.8 million per year. 
At a 10-percent discount rate, this annual subsidy is equivalent to a one-time 
payment of $58 million-a sizable subsidy, but conceivable in today's bid-
ding wars. For other states, poor market access or high labor costs made the 
requITed tax subsidy unrealistic. For example, the findings show that New York 
would not have captured Saturn even by eliminating all state and local taxes, 
which may explain the failure of New· York's financial offer to Saturn. 
TENNESSEE SUBSIDIES 
Given these findings, did Tennessee need to provide subsidies? Tennessee 
did, in fact, provide subsidies-although state offIcials often say that Tennessee 
did not. One state official claimed "we didn't give (Saturn) anything other than 
a good place to make a car." But the state has agreed to provide $20 to $30 
million in training for Saturn workers, and $50 million for the Saturn Parkway 
and other roads. 
Road improvements are often considered a normal public service, although 
a subsidy is provided to Saturn by expediting the improvements. However, 
. job training is likely to be equivalent to an unrestricted cash payment to Saturn. 
In the past, Tennessee industrial training funds for new and expanding firms 
have provided very short-term, inexpensive training for Tennesseans, averag-
ing $300 to $500 per trainee. Training frequently is done by the company, 
and the state just writes a check to cover the cost. Such training is more 
company-specillc than general. Further, in most cases the funds pay for train-
ing the company would do anyway, although the funds may encourage expan-
sion and more local hiring because state funds are restricted to training 
Tennesseans. 
As of late 1986, no final agreement had been reached on how Saturn train-
ing funds will be used. Sources indicate that Saturn funds may allow the train-
ing of non-Tennesseans, a change in state policy. Using all the training funds 
would be difficult if training were restricted to Tennesseans, particularly because 
the project has now been scaled back to 3,000 jobs, with laid-off GM workers 
from the North having first call on most of those jobs. 
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Even if all workers are eligible, the amount of training funds per worker 
will be higher than for Tennessee's typical industrial training. Original plans 
called for $20 million for 6,000 workers, or more than $3,000 in training 
per worker (six times the usual amount spent for training per worker). Hence, 
while past state industrial training has compensated fIrms for training they would 
ordinarily do, the Saturn training may be different. 
Saturn will also receive property tax breaks from local governments. One 
can argue that these property tax reductions are not a subsidy because Saturn's 
remaining property taxes exceed the increased public spending caused by the 
plant. 
Many economists argue that local business property taxes should be set 
close to the cost of providing services. They claim that capital and labor mobility 
prevent local governments from effectively redistributing income; therefore, 
local governments should leave redistribution to the federal government and 
aim instead at efficiently providing services at cost to businesses and households. 
Whatever the merits of this argument, Tennessee currently requires business 
property taxes to be higher than business service costs, and thus most Ten-
nessee businesses are paying for household services or to redistribute income 
to poor households. The Saturn property tax exemption is a subsidy because 
it exempts Saturn from this general requirement for Tennessee business. 
We calculated that Tennessee's training and property tax subsidies lowered 
Saturn's cost per car by $34, with $4 of this coming from the training subsidy 
and $30 from the propetty tax reduction.s This reduction is less than one-
third of the $118 per car in state and local taxes that Saturn would pay without 
these subsidies. 
Were these subsidies needed to get Saturn? Our data cannot provide a 
defInitive answer to this question. Other states were close to Tennessee in costs 
and a complete cost analysis, including the offers of other states, might reveal 
that the $34 per car subsidy was crucial. Furthermore, Tennessee offIcials 
may have felt obliged to offer Saturn a deal similar to that given Nissan, which 
located in nearby Smyrna, Tennessee, in 1980. Nissan received about the 
same level of industrial training funds per worker as Saturn and is paying prop-
erty taxes on the same service cost basis as Saturn. 
Finally, Tennessee subsidies are modest compared to those provided to 
auto plants by other states. Kentucky, for example, is providing its new Toyota 
plant with $55 million to train and subsidize the wages of 3,000 workers-
more than fIve times the "training" subsidy per worker provided by Tennessee. 
Kentucky also agreed to pay up to $35 million in land costs and site im-
provements for Toyota. 
OTHER LOCATIONAL FACTORS 
Tennessee offIcials also have stressed the importance of various nonquant-
ifIable factors to Saturn's location (e.g., the state's strong work ethic and low-
key industrial recruitment approach). In explaining the Saturn s~ccess, former 
Governor Lamar Alexander stated that "several states have a central location, 
but none has our unique work environment." 
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Our research supports the view that the Tennessee work ethic helped at-
tract Saturn. Interviews conducted for a previous study indicate that plant 
managers perceive Tennessee as having high worker productivity. One executive 
who had managed plants in both the South and North commented that "the 
basic attitude towards work is so different in the South. Workers in the North 
are not as flexible as workers in the South, even in a nonunion plant. I attribute 
this to years of 'fat living' in the North .... Our company figures that labor pro-
ductivity is 15 percent greater in the South compared to the North. ,,10 
A different work ethic may be particularly important to Saturn because 
GM officials see a change in labor-management relationships as crucial to the 
U.S. auto industry overcoming the $2,OOO-per-car Japanese cost advantage. 
Although laid-off GM workers will get first priority for Saturn jobs, eM of-
ficials may expect Southern cultural attitudes to influence the plant because 
some jobs will eventually go to Tennesseans, many Northern eM workers who 
will take Saturn jobs grew up in the South, and the community will reinforce 
Southern cultural attitudes. 
Although a strong work ethic may attract new branch plants, it is difficult 
for government to affect work attitudes and relationships. But if different work 
attitudes and labor-management relationships are boosting Japan's growth, U.S. 
political leaders may wish to consider how to improve these attitudes and 
relationships. 
Tennessee's low-key industrial recruitment may have also helped to at-
tract Saturn. Tennessee focused on quickly providing information to Saturn 
and on some personal contact by Governor Alexander and other state leaders 
with top eM officials, while avoiding public relation gimmicks and the crea-
tion of special Saturn subsidies. 
Providing information makes little difference to a company with eM's 
resources, although it may be essential in attracting the branch plants of smaller 
companies. But business confidence in state leaders is important because many 
complex regulatory issues arise during the start-up phase of a new branch plant. 
Due to the size and complexity of Saturn, GM would want reassurance that 
the state's political leadership would allow a quick resolution of problems such 
as environmental permits, zoning ordinances, and tax law interpretation. Losses 
caused by Saturn project delays could be enormous for eM. The company's 
confidence in Tennessee state leadership was justified in late 1985 when state 
leaders quickly acted to resolve a threat by Spring Hill's mayor to annex the 
Saturn site. 
The huge special subsidies offered Saturn by states such as Minnesota 
and New York, while helpful in a narrow economic sense, may have hurt these 
states' prospects because of eM's fear of negative public reaction. eM's of-
ficial explanation of the Saturn location decision says that these subsidies were 
not considered unless "the incentives were in common use or had been tested 
in the highest court in the state. ,,11 GM may also have feared that negative 
public reaction from special subsidies could create a backlash against GM in 
the state, increasing future problems. If Saturn had chosen Minnesota, the 
reported $1.2 billion subsidy (probably le~s than that in present value) might 
have caused future regulatory and tax problems. Tennessee's avoidance of 
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new subsidies, and the state's attempt to downplay the subsidies given, helped 
avoid negative reaction. 
The lowest cost method for states to attract branch plants may be to adopt 
industrial recruitment techniques attuned to the needs of the company being 
recruited. Tennessee did this in the Saturn case. The governors of some other 
states seemed more interested in getting political credit for having tried to at-
tract Saturn. 
THE BENEFITS OF SATURN 
Are the benefits of Saturn worth the costs? 
Political officials and the media often mistakenly assume that the economic 
benefits of a Saturn-type project are equal to the payroll provided by the plant 
and its support industries. This benefit measurement would be correct only 
if Saturn jobs did not displace other jobs (i.e., if the 20,000 Saturn-associated 
jobs led to a 20,000 increase of employment), and if the new workers employed 
all placed a zero value _ on their leisure time. This would be most nearly true 
if Saturn were located in an area with depression-level unemployment and all 
hiring were done locally. In a full-employment economy, a Saturn-type pro-
ject leads to a bidding up of wages, which both displaces some private employ-
ment and causes some marginal workers (i.e., workers who are close to indif-
ferent between work at prevailing wages and leisure) to join the labor force. 
The social efficiency benefits caused by the additional labor demand are zero. 
The characteristics of Saturn and its location imply that the Saturn-associated 
payroll is unlikely to be a good benefit measure. While Maury County, where 
the plant is to be located, has had high unemployment (about 8.4 percent in 
1985), it is by no means the highest in the state. Further, Saturn is just south 
of Williamson County, which for the l~t few years has had the state's lowest 
unemployment rate. Saturn is also likely to have its largest economic effects 
on the Nashville metropolitan area, which is by far Tennessee's fastest grow-
ing area. Finally, most Saturn workers will be laid-off auto workers from the 
North. 
Thus, several factors prevent the Saturn-associated payroll from fully 
benefitting Tennesseans: some portion of Saturn's jobs will displace other private 
sector jobs as wages increase in middle Tennessee; some of the new jobs will 
go to unemployed migrants from the North (providing employment benefits 
to them and not to current Tennessee residents); and of the remaining net 
new jobs going to Tennesseans, some proportion is likely to go to workers who 
have a relatively weak attachment to the labor force and thus could be said 
to have relatively small benefits from employment. 
Another claimed benefit that helps mobilize political support for projects 
such as Saturn is the increase in land values caused by these projects. We 
exarriined 1985 land sales within eight miles of the Saturn site and found that 
the average price per acre increased from $1,890 before the Saturn announce-
ment to $5,229 afterwards. 12 If we simply assume that all land within that 
radius of Saturn increased by this amount, we get a total increase in land values 
of $431 million. A slightly more sophisticated analysis, which incorporates 
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differences in land value increases at various distances from the Saturn plant 
and the proposed Saturn Parkway, estimates an aggregate land value increase 
Gf $722 million within eight miles of Saturn. While some of this land may 
not be suitable for development, one would assume that land value effects ex-
tend beyond eight miles. Thus, it seems safe to assume that Saturn has raised 
land values near its site by between $500 million and $1 billion. 
While this increase is obviously a benefit to the original landowners, it 
largely represents a transfer of wealth from other groups in society. The resulting 
rent increase hurts renters living in Maury County. The land value increases 
paid by migrants to Maury County will be matched by land value decreases 
in the areas from which the migrants originate. To the extent the migrants come 
from outside Tennessee, this transfer of land values is a net benefit to current 
Tennesseans, but from a national perspective the land value changes cancel out. 
The most important economic benefit of Saturn is not the change in land 
values or in the number of jobs, but the change in the types of jobs in Ten-
nessee. By actively pursuing the Saturn plant, the state has essentially followed 
an "industrial policy" of seeking to alter the structure of Tennessee's economy. 
The Saturn plant will increase the proportion of higher wage, higher-skilled 
jobs, in contrast to Tennessee's traditional reliance on low-wage manufactur-
ing. Further, while the Saturn plant and its spinoffs involve some job skills, 
they are the types of jobs in which much on-the-job training can be done. As 
Saturn's initial Northern workers leave due to normal employment turnover, 
Tennessee workers with relatively low formal job skills will have a good oppor-
tunity for entry-level positions through which they can develop job skills. 
One concern about Saturn is that it will increase the volatility of the economy 
in middle Tennessee, making it more sensitive to national economic cycles. 
Assuming that the Nashville area continues its rapid growth, the 6,000 Saturn 
jobs (as originally planned) would increase the transportation equipment in-
dustry's total employment in the Nashville area from 3.1 percent >of 
nonagricultural employment today to 3.9 percent in 1990.13 If one assumes 
that 5,000 additional jobs would be created in automotive supply industries, 
and all those jobs were officially classified in the transportation equipment in-
dustry, the transportation equipment industry share for Nashyille in 1990 would 
be 4.9 percent. The recent scaling down of the Saturn project implies 1990 
shares of 3.5 percent (without suppliers) and 4.0 percent (with suppliers). 
While these shares exceed the national share of 2 percent, the transporta-
tion equipment industry would still provide less than one-twentieth of Nashville's 
employment. The 4.9 percent share compares with Detroit's share of 12.1 
percent and Flint, Michigan's share of 30.1 percent. Nashville is obviously 
still far from becoming another Detroit or Flint. Therefore, the increased volatility 
caused by Saturn can be managed by state and local governments. Concern 
about volatility would become more serious if other major auto manufacturers 
located in the Nashville area. 
A second concern is that these jobs may not be viable in the long term 
if the U.S. auto industry fails in its efforts to become more competitive in the 
world market. 
On the whole, for Tennessee the higher wages and job skills resulting from 
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Saturn are worth the risks of greater economic instability and possible long-
term decline in the auto industry. The same conclusion might not hold for 
other states that sought Saturn. For example, Michigan might be wise to diver-
sify away from the auto industry, arid Minnesota does not face a low-wage 
problem. 
From a national perspective, many analysts argue that state competition 
for branch plants such as Saturn is a zero-sum game: Tennessee's gain is Ken-
tucky's loss if the total number of branches is fIxed. But this argument ignores 
the likely increase in the total number of new branch plants nationwide if com-
petitive pressures force state and local business taxes lower. Further, the social 
benefits from a plant like Saturn might not be the same for all possible loca-
tions. From a distributional point of view, the national interest might best be 
served by a Saturn plant location in a below average income state such as 
Tennessee. 
STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
Tennessee should be proud of the Saturn success. However, the economic 
development strategy of branch plant recruitment is becoming inadequate in 
today's economy. Fewer new manufacturing branch plants are being located 
in the United States, and the average size of new plants is smaller. As one 
Tennessee state official said, "The golden days of industry leaving the North 
d . S h ,,14 an mOVIng out are over. 
Economic growth is shifting to services, particularly business and finan-
cial services, which created more than one-third of all new U.S. jobs between 
1979 and 1984. Research increasingly supports the view that small businesses 
create a higher proportion of new jobs than their share in empioyment. Firms 
with fewer than 20 employees created 39 percent of U.S. new jobs between 
1976 and 1982.15 > 
Further, simply recruiting branch plants does not deal with the growing 
regional disparities in many states. For example, Tennessee has a dual economy: 
while Nashville booms, 47 of Tennessee's 70 non metropolitan counties had 
greate~ than 10 percent unemployment in 1985.16 
Even in recruitment, the factors attracting branches are changing as the 
United States shifts to research-intensive production that requires skilled labor. 
Research resources available at universities are becoming' more important to 
some companies, while other companies are more interested in whether skilled 
worke~ will be attracted to the area's amenities. 
As a result, states are supplementing branch plant recruitment with other 
po:Ucies. Twenty states have venture capital funds for new small business. Twelve 
states have sponsored entrepreneurship training programs. Thirty-three states 
have high-tech promotion programs. Twenty states have enacted "enterprise 
zone" legislation. And many states have expanded funding for education. 17 
Given the increasing complexity of economic development policy, 1 7 states 
now have a written economic development strategy to guide state actions. 
Whether a state adopts a written strategy or not, most states need some type 
of policy process that provides information on the state economy, encourages 
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a long-term commitment to economic development, coordinates the different 
elements of the strategy, encourages new ideas, and provides for evaluation. 
This policy process should encompass a wide variety of state interests-
government officials, business, labor, commmunity groups, universities, and 
the media. Broad participation can help create new ideas and encourage political 
support for economic development. 
State strategies require goals. In addition to industrial recruitment, states 
should focus on three goals: improving basic public services; dealing with gaps 
in the markets for capital, labor, and knowledge; and helping residents in 
distressed areas. 
Current evidence suggests that roads and education are the key public 
services for economic growth. Both require increased taxes, which discourage 
growth. To maximize the growth benefits of expanded public services while 
minimizing the needed tax increases, states should seek to increase the pro-
ductiVity of public services as they are expanded. According to a recent report, 
Minnesota is one state that has followed this strategy of high levels of highly 
d · bli . 18 pro uchve pu c servIces. 
States also may want t~ deal with gaps in capital markets. Given the tradi-
tional regulation and lack of competition in financial markets, financial institu-
tions tend to avoid high-risk investments, such as in small business, even if 
the expected return (including the risks) is above alternative investments. 
Government venture funds are one option. An alternative approach is to get 
the private sector interested in new ventures through encouraging greater com-
petition in financial markets and allowing some risk pooling. In 1977, 
Massachusetts granted a tax cut for the insurance industry In exchange for 
having it set up a $100-million investment fund for businesses unable to get 
conventional financing. The Massachusetts insurance industry reportedly has 
been surprised by the good performance of the fund's investments. 19 
One rationale for the traditional government subsidies for education and 
job training is that these programs address gaps in labor and capital markets. 
Unique difficulties are faced in investing in "human capital" (compared with 
physical capital purchases) because human capital, unlike a car, cannot be 
repossessed. A similar rationale can justify training programs for entrepreneur-
ship skills. tnterviews with people working to assist entrepreneurs suggest that 
many have no knowledge of how to put together a business plan. Currently, 
a number of small-scale programs in entrepreneurship training are being con-
ducted in the United States.20 
Finally, some observers see a gap in support for applied research that falls 
between basic research traditionally sponsored by government and product 
development undertaken by firms. The argument is that private firms 
underinvest in applied high tech research because the ideas are difficult to 
patent and the fields are changing so rapidly that patents would have limited 
value. In response to this perceived gap, some states are setting up applied 
research centers. Michigan, for example, has set up centers in robotics, 
biotechnology, and electronics. 21 
Perhaps the most difficult issue is what to do about distressed areas within 
a state. While seeking to prevent inevitable economic decline seems futile, so 
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does inducing people to leave those areas. Solutions to regional economic 
development may need to have two components: providing good education 
and retraining to those who want to leave the area, while seeking to build on 
whatever comparative advantages the area possesses. 
In a previous study, Tennessee was given good marks for its industrial 
recruitment, Better Schools, and 1986 roads programs.22 But Tennessee lacks 
an organization or process that would encourage the long-run continuation and 
improvement of these efforts. Further, Tennessee's efforts in small business, 
high-tech, service industries, and applied research are minimal compared to 
some other states. 
Therefore, Tennessee would benefit from a broadening of its economic 
development policies and efforts to bring different groups together around 
economic development issues. While Saturn does not preclude these policy 
changes, success often breeds complacency . We hope that the Saturn success 
will not distract Tennessee officials from the more fundamental aspects of 
economic development policy, and that other states do not take Saturn as their 
sole model for an economic development strategy . 
• • • • 
NOTES 
L Business Week, August 1985. 
2. For more details on this model, see Steve Lake, "Summary of Progress on the ·Saturn 
Location Decision " (Working Paper , Vanderbilt University, 1986). 
3. Small car demand weights would be preferable, but were not available. Distance was 
assumed to be proportional to air miles. Some experimentation with trying to use actual 
rail distances did not change the results. 
4. The tax costs are taken from Table 3 in James Papke, "The Taxation of the Saturn Cor-
poration" (Working Paper, Purdue University, 1985). The marginal state tax rates reported 
by Papke were converted into tax costs per car by fIrst multiplying eM's $3.5 ~illion 
investment in Saturn by the pretax rate of return of 25 percent assumed by Papke to 
get average annual Saturn profits; these profIts were then multiplied by Papke's tax rates 
to determine an annual tax cost for Saturn. Then-to derive a tax cost per car~the an-
nual tax cost was divided by an assumed Saturn annual production rate of 480,000 cars. 
The local supplier labor cost per car is derived by assuming 20 hours of local supplier 
labor used per ~ar, and multiplying this by the statewide manufacturing wage rate. We 
feel 20 hours is a conservative estimate of the amount of local supplier labor. This cor-
responds to assuming about 5,000 supplier jobs will locate in middle Tennessee to serve 
the 6,000 Saturn jobs, as 5,000 supplier jobs times 40 hours per week times 50 weeks 
per year, divided by 480,000 cars, is about 21 hours per car. eM has claimed there 
will be 14,000 support jobs created for Saturn, although this apparently includes some 
retail and other spinoff jobs. A study of the Nissan plant estimated one supplier job for 
each Nissan job. See U.S., Department of Transportation, Pilot Case Study: The Deci-
sion By Nissan to Build a Light Truck Assembly Plant in Smyrna, Tennessee by Richard 
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